Outer Space Treaty, 1967 — Article I

The wealth of space belongs to everyone.
The Artemis Accords are designed to make sure it never reaches us.

In 1967, the Outer Space Treaty voluntarily bound 114 nations to a principle of unity: the wealth of space is the province of all mankind. Not the first flag planted. Not the first corporation incorporated. Everyone. That principle has never been implemented. The Artemis Accords, signed by forty nations since 2020, establish extraction rights while deliberately omitting the benefit-sharing mechanism the treaty they signed requires. Water ice at the lunar south pole. Helium-3. Platinum-group metals on near-Earth asteroids. The best and closest deposits are finite, concentrated, and non-renewable. Once the precedent is set under a first-in-time framework, it becomes case law. The window to build an alternative is measured in months, not decades.

Anchored in international law

OST 1967
114 Nations
Article I
Non-Appropriation
Commons MULKI

The Artemis Problem

First in time, first in right. Colonialism with a spreadsheet. In 2020, the United States wrote the Artemis Accords — a bilateral framework that lets extraction companies claim celestial resources without specifying how the benefits reach "all countries." Forty nations have signed. The Accords establish extraction rights while deliberately leaving out the mechanism for benefit-sharing.

01

The richest deposits are finite

Water ice at the lunar south pole. Helium-3. Platinum-group metals on near-Earth asteroids. These are concentrated and non-renewable. There is no second chance at the best sites.

02

The precedent becomes case law

Once extraction occurs under the Artemis framework, challenging it requires a state-to-state action in the ICJ. By then, it's established practice. The OST's benefit-sharing obligation becomes decoration.

03

Everyone loses — even extractors

Without legitimate governance, every claim is contestable. Insurance is uncertain. Contracts signed under questioned authority may not hold in all 114 signatory courts. A race without rules is expensive for everyone.

The danger is not that extraction will happen. Extraction is good — unextracted resources benefit no one. The danger is that extraction will happen under a framework designed for speed and profit rather than shared benefit, and that the precedent will become permanent. A first-in-time-first-in-right framework incentivizes speed over care, waste over stewardship, claim-staking over sustainable development. Everyone loses in that world — even the extractors, who face contested claims and legal uncertainty without a legitimate governance framework.

“But anger without a tool is just noise.”

Three core pillars

A monetary system governed by code that cannot break its own rules. Designed so that when celestial resources are extracted, the revenue flows to a commons fund that benefits everyone — not as charity, but as architecture.

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DING Currency

Price-stable money for everyday transactions. Created by depositing assets into the commons fund. Destroyed to reclaim value. No voting rights. Pure medium of exchange.

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🏛

Commons Fund

The wealth portfolio backing every unit of currency. Investment-grade assets, extractive equity, celestial holdings. The Protocol Treasury receives royalties and reinvests returns to back the peg.

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MULKI

Fixed 21 million supply. In rare self-healing scenarios when DING trades below peg, the protocol may sell MULKI at a discount to AMM price to restore collateral. Otherwise earned through participation or purchased from existing holders on secondary markets. Governance power cannot be bought from the issuer at market price. Voting power unlocks on the new chain, ideally after Phase 3.

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Trust through transparency

Every transition is triggered by verifiable milestones — automatic, transparent, and irreversible. Credibility cannot be asserted; it must be earned.

Dual Treasury Separation

The Protocol Treasury invests and takes risk for return. The DIWAN Treasury is buyer of last resort and makes credible commitments without risk appetite. The same entity cannot be both investor and backstop.

Hard 20% Bond Ceiling

Total bonds outstanding cannot exceed 20% of circulating DING supply. When the cap is hit, auctions pause automatically. This prevents the uncapped liability growth that destroyed Terra.

Earning-Only MULKI

The protocol never sells MULKI tokens. MULKI power cannot be bought from the issuer — it must be earned through participation or purchased from existing holders. Capture is structurally expensive.

No Reversion

Phase 4 entry is permanent. The collateral hardening ratchet does not reverse — each successful step locks in the credibility the system earned. Governance can tighten; it cannot undo without a constitutional convention that requires 90% supermajority.

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Future Development

Celestial Network

A future interface for when celestial resource extraction generates protocol revenue. The Celestial Network tracks citizen distributions, extraction revenue, and commons fund allocation from orbital operations.