MULKI
One unified voting pool. No privileged logic. No founder veto. No security council override. Natural constraints over privileged exceptions.
Unified Pool
Most governance systems create privileged logic: a separate council, a founder veto, a security committee with override powers. The Protocol eliminates all of this because privileged logic will be captured. It is not a risk. It is a certainty.
There is one unified voting pool. Treasury tokens vote alongside staked user tokens. Before Phase 4, treasury influence is governed by hard-coded rules: specific allocations require specific majorities, and the treasury cannot vote on its own distribution.
Natural Transition
As circulating supply grows, the treasury's share of total voting power declines automatically. No explicit handover is required. The founders' influence decays at 10% per annum. Staked tokens earn a 2x voice multiplier; unstaked tokens receive 0.5x.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Founder decay | 10% per annum |
| Staked multiplier | 2x |
| Unstaked multiplier | 0.5x |
| Standard threshold | 60% |
| Trial step thresholds | 60%, 65%, 70%, 75% |
| Solemnity threshold | 67% |
LLM Delegate
At Phase 4, the Protocol Treasury is governed by a three-model consensus of large language models executing a constitutional prompt.
- Decision principles: Solvency first, stability second, equity third
- Prohibited actions: No inflation without collateral, no bond restructuring, no reversion from Phase 5
- Escalation: Three independent models must agree; if they disagree, a human federation adjudicates
The LLM has defensive veto authority, not proposal authority. It can block dangerous proposals. It cannot initiate them.
A system that can be improved by its governors can also be corrupted by them. The LLM delegate is designed to resist capture by having no interests of its own. It does not hold tokens. It does not receive fees. It cannot be bribed because it has no wallet.
Anonymous Developer Federation
There is no corporate entity. No single repository owner. Developers contribute with cryptographic attestation rather than known identities.
| Layer | Threshold | Timelock | Max Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emergency Council | 3-of-5 | Zero | 72 hours |
| Federation | 5-of-9 | 48 hours | 14 days |
| Constitutional Lock | 7-of-9 + LLM | None | Once per lifetime |
No single person can pause the protocol. No single raid can stop development. The developer federation is the governance counterpart to the wargaming analysis: if you cannot find the developers, you cannot coerce them.